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MegatrendBrief 
The megatrend report “The coronavirus transformation” examines central changes to 
the megatrends of globalization and digitalization as a consequence of the Covid-
19 pandemic. It also illuminates interactions between these megatrends that are 
particularly affected by the crisis and demographic change, and effects on our 
economic and societal systems. Finally, it brings up five theses concerning the 
future of the megatrends. 
 
I. Megatrends – what is it about? 
A megatrend is a long-term process of societal, 
economic, and political change with a significant 
impact on a larger number of areas of life, in-
cluding the spheres of work, consumer and leisure 
behavior, health, education, cultural identity, and 
political participation. 
This report focuses on globalization and digi-
talization as megatrends that were particularly 
affected by the coronavirus crisis. At the same 
time, however, we illuminate relevant interactions 
with demographic change. These megatrends 
have an individual and combined influence on 
other megatopics such as climate change, which 
are no less relevant. This kind of trends changes 
the lives of people around the world, albeit with 
different effects on different regions and groups. 
Globalization is the increasing economic, political, 
social, and cultural integration of countries and 
people around the world. Economic globalization 
affects the international division of labor and 
border-crossing trade in goods, services, capital, 
labor, technology, and knowledge.  
Digitalization concerns the global distribution of 
information and communication technologies, 
including networking and acceleration tendencies 
that set off considerable changes in the political, 
social, cultural, and economic structures of so-
cieties. 
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Demographic change refers to the changing size 
and structure of the population. This change has 
three causes: birth rate, life expectancy, and 
global migration. 
II. Pandenomics – the effects of the 
coronavirus pandemic on the global 
economy 
The global economic crisis wrought by the Covid-
19 pandemic is the third great economic de-
pression in this century, following the burst 
Dotcom bubble in the early 2000s and the 
Lehmann bankruptcy in 2008/09. The first two 
crises originated in a speculative bubble that 
burst, leading to an abrupt reduction in the 
demand for goods and services. In contrast, a 
pandemic is an exogenous shock that causes not 
only a loss of demand but also disrupts production 
at the same time.  
The effects of a combined demand and supply 
crisis in nearly every economy around the world 
are reason for concern. The expected global GDP 
collapse will be higher than it would in an 
economic crisis where only demand reduces. This 
also makes it higher than it was in the global 
recession following the Lehman bankruptcy in the 
fall of 2008. To further aggravate the situation, the 
global economic environment had already suf-
fered before the outbreak of the pandemic (Brexit, 
trade disputes between the USA and China, USA 
threatening to impose punitive tariffs on EU 
products, etc.). 
The scope of the economic losses feared is 
reflected in a comparison between GDP develop-
ments in 2009 and the expected rates of change 
for 2020 (Fig. 1). Global GDP dropped by only 0.1 
percent during the Lehman bankruptcy. For 2020, 
however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
expects a global GDP reduction approaching five 
percent in its forecast from June 2020. Germany 
is also expected to experience a stronger loss of 
growth in 2020 than it did in 2009 (7.8 percent as 
compared to 5.7 percent). 
Its large scope is not the only thing that will make 
the current global economic crisis more difficult to 
overcome than the two depressions preceding it. 
The available monetary and fiscal policy mea-
sures are less effective here than they would be if 
only demand was in crisis. The already-low in-
terest rates and the severity of the economic da-
mage will require much greater economic stimulus 
packages from the governments around the world 
than the situation in the wake of the Lehman bank-
ruptcy did. This will continue to drive up un-
avoidable state debt to cover the necessary sup-
port measures, without which a long-term eco-
nomic collapse with considerable social tensions 
would threaten. 
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It has not yet known whether massive economic 
depression and sharply rising debt, not only for 
governments but also in companies, together will 
send the financial market into crisis. Some 
stabilization is provided by most central banks 
announcing that they would buy government and 
corporate bonds on the securities markets to 
strengthen the financial markets. The interaction 
of monetary policy thus supporting the expan-
sionary fiscal policy probably is a major reason 
why most stock exchanges recovered quickly 
from a massive price collapse. However, this 
monetary policy is not entirely harmless, as it 
feeds gigantic amounts of money into the 
economic system, providing the monetary basis 
for new speculative bubbles.  
The Covid-19 pandemic is far from over. It is 
probably going to take years before its economic 
and social damage can be healed. In light of the 
severity of the economic crisis and the enormous 
efforts required to manage and mitigate it, one 
thing should be clear already: this momentous 
event will change our economic lives for the long 
term. Where megatrends are concerned, we 
expect two developments to become particularly 
relevant: digitalization of the economy, which has 
been accelerated further by the Covid-19 pan-
demic, and a shortening of global value creation 
chains. 
III. The Covid-19 pandemic as a catalyst 
for the digitalization of the economy 
The Covid-19 pandemic with its impact on the 
economy can serve as an additional incentive for 
companies to make greater use of digital techno-
logies. This may not be able to reduce suscepti-
bility to crises in all areas if another epidemic or 
pandemic occurs, but at least in many of them 
(Petersen 2020). The pandemic-related reduc-
tion of demand may be battled by a shift to online 
trading at least in some segments. Digital so-
lutions can also counteract the health-related ab-
sences of workers to mitigate the supply crisis. 
Remote work is a measure intensely used in this 
context.  
Another response to the experience of the Covid-
19 pandemic with a target rather for the medium 
term is increasing use of machines, robots, and 
other digital technologies in production. By re-
placing human labor, automation reduces depen-
dence on it. This trend is already in full swing since 
digital technologies bring about considerable 
productivity increase that reduce costs. Using 
such technologies to increase resilience against 
crises in production now acts as an additional 
incentive. However, not all industries and com-
panies have the same opportunities to use digital 
technologies to reduce their vulnerability to crises. 
New social tensions may grow from this (also: first 
edition of the Megatrend Report, Bertelsmann 
Foundation 2019, pp. 61 et seq., 72 et seq.). 
While producers of physical goods can resort to 
online trading, this is not an option for many forms 
of social consumption, and in particular tourism. 
The providers of such consumer activities (and 
their employees) are, therefore, subject to a 
greater risk of losing income from the ongoing, 
and any future, pandemic. The situation for social 
consumption is aggravated since, in contrast to 
physical products, it is difficult or even impossible 
to catch up with the loss of consumption due to 
the epidemic, increasing the economic harm to 
companies and employees in these industries.  
The ability to work from home is also unequally 
distributed across society. In particular in the area 
of personal services, such as hairdressing and 
large parts of the health and care sector, this form 
of work is not an option. For economic policy this 
means that anyone who is unable (or only partially 
able) to use digital technologies as a factor to 
stave off crisis must receive support in the form of 
sufficient funding to secure their income in the 
event of a renewed crisis.  
In addition to such product- and activity-related 
differences, divergent financial capacities for 
company investments must be considered: Those 
already using digital technologies and able to 
weather the economic crisis reasonably well can 
increase their advantage by further investment in 
robots, machines, and software. Companies 
weakened by the Covid-19 crisis due to a lower 
degree of digitalization do not have such oppor-
tunities. The digital divide that always affects a 
company’s employees is, therefore, gaping open. 
Progressing digitalization not only strengthens 
crisis resilience but also reduces the costs for 
border-crossing trade. Though internationally 
MegatrendBrief | Page 4 
competitive companies can increase their exports 
and employment this way, competitive pressure 
from foreign providers increases as well. This 
accelerates the structural change throughout the 
economy and may lead to income loss for certain 
regions or persons (Fig. 2). 
IV. The Covid-19 pandemic and the future 
of “Made in the World” 
The Covid-19 pandemic has caused great 
disruption among the trade and production 
networks. Lockdown measures have led to short-
term production and demand issues in many 
countries around the world. Companies are 
looking for ways to render their production chains 
less susceptible to crisis in order to promote 
resilience, i.e. the ability to survive an acute crisis 
well and to recover quickly thereafter. The pan-
demic will probably end up acting as a catalyst for 
reorganization of global production networks. The 
coronavirus significantly increases the need to 
react to old and new megatrends alike. 
It has become the normal for us to live in a world 
of border-crossing value creation chains. From an 
economic perspective, such a detailed division of 
production steps is sensible to make production 
particularly efficient. This coin has a flip side, too. 
Many industrialized countries were already show-
ing increasing anti-globalization tendencies 
before the Covid-19 crisis.  While attitudes to-
wards trade and globalization remain positive in 
general, their details reflect public concerns 
(Fig. 3) for a variety of reasons. A considerable 
proportion of the population feels insufficiently 
protected from potential negative effects of glo-
balization by their respective national govern-
ments (Bluth 2018). The crisis may cause this 
tendency to increase. 
These dependencies caused by specialization of 
production networks may also have some 
strategic use (“Weaponized Interdependence”, 
Farrell and Newman 2019). The relevance of 
economic dependencies was particularly evident 
when production and delivery issues caused by 
lockdown measures imposed by trading partners 
appeared in the early weeks of the Covid-19 
pandemic. Export bans on medical goods and, to 
a certain extent, food further complicated things. 
This reflects a geo-economic globalization 
increasingly displacing conventional liberal 
globalization. In this form of globalization, trade 
policy no longer pursues the primary goal of 
increasing prosperity. Instead, it is targeted at 
expanding political influence. 
Change to the trends towards increasing 
automation of production and customization of 
products probably would have caused a shift in 
the structure of international value creation chains 
even without strengthening of the geo-economy 
and the appearance of Covid-19. Labor costs 
obviously are not the essential factor for the 
choice of production site when production is  
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subject to a high degree of automation. Other 
factors, such as “time to market” and the 
availability of good, and in particular digital, 
infrastructure grow more relevant. The nature of 
production changes at the same time, moving 
away from producing a large number of goods for 
an expected demand, and towards small batches 
to match the actual demand at hand. 
Covid-19 most likely is not going to remain the last 
pandemic. We must expect that progressing 
urbanization and increase in prosperity, combined 
with a high level of international mobility, will make 
epidemics another new megatrend. This in-
creases the need to establish resilient systems. 
Stockpiling is one option, though difficult to 
implement in practice. It is impossible to predict 
what goods will be needed in what quantities 
during future epidemics. The situation is similar 
concerning the availability of production capa-
cities. Once again, the capacities required are not 
clear in advance. Diversification of risk is a better 
strategy. The target here is not to be dependent 
on a specific supplier or region, but to have the 
broadest possible network of supply capacities. 
“Just in Time” has long been the slogan of modern 
production. Stocks were considered an un-
necessary cost factor and production was 
optimized for greatest efficiency. The Covid-19 
crisis now makes the weaknesses of this system 
visible. One likely consequence of this is that 
companies are going to focus less on maximizing 
efficiency and more to securing resilience by im-
plementing some kind of “buffer”. This may take 
the form of production overcapacity, stock-
keeping, diversification, reduction of supply 
chains, and modernization. “Just in Case” is going 
to replace “Just in Time”. 
V. Five theses regarding the future of 
megatrends 
We believe that the developments described 
above result in five central tendencies in the future 
development of digitalization, globalization and 
demographic change: 
1. The question of digital sovereignty is 
growing more important 
An entity is digitally sovereign if its digital 
dependencies are the result of choice and thus 
can be altered at will. This entails that the entity in 
question is free to implement policies that reflect 
its values and targets within its social, economic, 
and regulatory policy areas. The core challenge 
for digital sovereignty in Europe is, therefore, 
reducing its dependence on third parties when it 
comes to digital technologies and business 
models. In light of the acceleration of digi-
talization, and the resulting structural change, the 
question of digital sovereignty becomes more 
urgent than ever. Europe should see the 
pandemic as a wake-up call and drive digital 
change actively and in a value-based and 
targeted manner in order to reduce critical 
dependencies on third parties. Such a “smart 
resilience” can lead to an increase in European 
competitiveness and opportunities for Europeans 
in all walks of society to enjoy its fruits. 
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2. International division of labor is 
increasingly under pressure  
Efficiency and cost minimization used to be 
essential aspects in the design of international 
division of labor. Since reliability of supply will 
likely still be a relevant issue in future, we expect 
a tendency towards further diversification of 
value-creation chains and increased inventory-
building. However, efficiency loss is the price to 
be paid for reducing reliance on supplies from the 
rest of the world. The partial renationalization of 
production processes could also trigger a 
renewed protectionism race. Another problem, 
finally, is that German companies procure certain 
input products from overseas either because the 
corresponding local products are uncompetitive or 
because certain resources are not locally 
available. This means that purchasers will 
continue to opt for currently available, more cost-
efficient overseas goods and services even 
outside times of crisis when such products are no 
longer imported unless and until the underlying 
economic outlook is altered. Therefore, re-
localization of the production of certain goods, 
which is expected to minimize risks, will hardly be 
possible without some form of state support. 
Diversification of value-creation chains so that 
input products are purchased not only from one 
country of origin, but from several, adds, 
furthermore, to costs. 
3. The relevance of vertical industry policy is 
increasing 
China, the USA, and other nations support key 
industries with a promising future such as 
electromobility, robot technology or biomedicine 
to a considerable extent with targeted support for 
selective sectors or technologies (vertical industry 
policy). If Germany and Europe have no desire to 
fall behind in these areas or become dependent 
on foreign imports, they will have to step up the 
pace in vertical industry policy as well. This is not 
about copying Chinese or US approaches but 
rather about developing a dedicated industrial 
policy approach true to the values and societal 
targets of a social market economy.  
4. Innovation capability becomes a core 
resilience factor 
The question of industry policy will emerge as 
especially relevant to the innovation area. The 
intensifying hegemonial conflict between China 
and the USA reinforces the competition in 
innovation between these two states. Dedicated 
technology spheres of influence are growing in 
which either Chinese or US standards apply and 
where technology developments from one of 
these countries dominate. The Covid-19 crisis 
further accelerates this trend. It reflects just how 
quickly states can be cut off from foreign 
innovations and shows how valuable domestic 
innovation capacity is in times of crisis. When it 
comes to increasing digitalization, domestic 
capabilities in technologies such as artificial 
intelligence, 5G, or blockchain will gain in 
importance. Measured by particularly relevant 
patents, the USA is the global leader in many 
future technologies, and in particular in digi-
talization. China has boosted its power of 
innovation with rapid growth in the last few years.  
MegatrendBrief | Page 7 
 
Europe – and even more so emerging countries – 
face, however, a grim future as they are at risk of 
losing their foothold in the race and of declining 
into technology vassals (Fig. 4).  
5. Progressing demographic change includes 
additional “interference factors” 
Demographic aging will reach a “hot phase” in 
many European countries in this decade. This 
adds extra “interference factors” when it comes to 
managing the economic consequences of the 
Covid-19 crisis and creating crisis-resilient 
structures. The aging and shrinking of the working 
population will dampen economic growth in 
Germany already in the course of the 2020s 
(Fig. 5). This will be exacerbated by increasing 
state expenditure related to demographic change. 
The discussion on the re-localization of the 
production of certain goods needs to take into 
account that Germany is heading for a phase of 
acute lack of specialists in its labor force. Broadly 
automating production processes can have 
comprehensive consequences for the wage-
related and contribution-based funding of the 
social security systems, potentially requiring 
some fundamental structural reforms. Finally, 
fiscal room for maneuver is shrinking, making it all 
the more important to distribute the available 
budget between future investments and the 
protection of age-related welfare benefits in a 
socially equitable manner. This will become a key 
political challenge, as older age groups make up 
a steadily growing share of voters.  
 
This and other developments will result in 
pervasive structural changes in the economy and 
society as a whole, while bringing substantial 
adjustments for citizens in their wake. The 
already-high demands to support of such changes 
by social- and education-policy measures are 
ever growing. Yet, they are necessary to prevent 
an attitude of resistance across large parts of the 
population. 
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